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1 Introduction
What is the economic value of knowing Catalan in Catalonia for an individual? Dur-
ing most of the twentieth century Catalan, although official during most of Catalonia’s
history, was given an informal status, thus losing its economic value. Public policies
supported Castilian (Spanish1) against Catalan until the mid-seventies, but they re-
versed at the beginning of the eighties, and Catalan has since been given priority
over Castilian. This switch in language policy (normalització) implied not only that
immigrants2 had to learn the local language to assimilate to a new economy, but also
that locals had to become more proficient in the use of their own language. It is clear
that in current times Catalan has recovered its economic value, but it is not clear
how much this value represents.
In this paper I measure the contribution of knowing Catalan to the probability of
being employed in Catalonia. I use a sample of census data for the last two available
census years, 1991 and 1996. The data consist of socioeconomic variables, employ-
ment status, and knowledge of Catalan language. Accounting for the determinants of
selection into knowing Catalan and verifying the sensitivity of results to specification
used, I estimate the probability of being employed conditional on a level of Catalan
knowledge by gender and census year. Speaking and reading Catalan increases the
probability of being employed by between 3 and 5 percentage points, whereas writing
Catalan increases the probability of being employed by between 1 and 4 percentage
points. This premium is higher for women than for men and decreasing in years of
schooling and in age. It is also positive both for individuals who know Catalan and
for those who do not know it, although it is higher for the former than for the latter.
The economic incentive for learning Catalan is thus crucial, but not sufficient to
explain differences in Catalan knowledge; non-economic considerations are also im-
1Castilian is generally known as “Spanish” outside the Iberian Peninsula, except in parts of
Latin-America.
2In Catalonia the term “immigrant” is used indistinctly for all born outside Catalonia, be they
born in the rest of Spain or in another country.
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portant: being born in Catalonia, arriving at a young age and having spent more time
in Catalonia increase the probability of knowing Catalan. In particular, externalities,
such as living in a community where people know Catalan and are Catalan born,
increase also the probability of knowing Catalan.
The economic literature treats language mostly as a particular form of human
capital which, as such, has an economic value. As Chiswick & Miller (1995) explain,
language has all the characteristics of human capital: it is embodied in the person, it is
productive in the labor market and/or in consumption, and it is created at a sacrifice
of time and out-of-pocket resources. Most of the literature on language has focused
on measuring the effect of its acquisition on the absorption of immigrants in several
countries: the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia, Israel, Germany (McManus 1985,
Kossoudji 1988, Dustmann 1994, Rivera-Batiz 1990, Chiswick & Miller 1995). In this
sense, language acquisition is a chapter in the study of immigrants’ assimilation to a
recipient economy (Borjas 1987).
Language, however, also has an economic value for the native population. Most
societies are composed of different speech communities, which communicate using
related but different verbal and nonverbal languages (Lang 1986). Thus, economic life
is segregated by speech community to minimize transaction costs that are ultimately
paid by the minority group, which tends to learn the language of the majority. As
Lazear (1999) remarks, countries in which different languages are used, as a result
of immigration or not, may wonder about the convenience of converging toward one
language. In this line, there are several cases in which the official language of a country
was changed. For example, Angrist & Lavy (1997) study the effect of arabization,
that is, the switch from French to Arabic instruction, in the local population of
Morocco, and find there that was a decrease in the returns to schooling. In Europe,
there are also several cases in which the official language was reversed; some examples
are: from German to Hungarian in Hungary, or from Russian to Estonian in Estonia
(with similar changes in other Baltic countries). These language changes, which are
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similar to the change experienced in Catalonia in the eighties, involve not only the
‘immigrants’ but also the ‘natives.’
The importance of Catalan language is illustrated in Figure 1, based on Reixach
(1997) . It shows the percentage of people who understand, speak, read, and write
Catalan in 1991 in Catalonia by comarques, a political subdivision smaller than the
province. Only in Barcelona the percentage of people who understand Catalan is
below 90%, but still above 75%. The percentage of people in each county that speak
or read Catalan is at least 70%. For written Catalan these percentages can fall to 30%
even in counties where Catalan is widely spoken, showing the big regional disparity
in the different levels of Catalan proficiency.
Figure 2 portrays the evolution of the percentage of the population that speaks
Catalan in Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearics.3 Until 1975, the percentage of
Catalan speakers went down in all three areas. In Valencia and the Balearics this
percentage has continued to go down. Only in Catalonia is this trend strongly re-
versed: the percentage of Catalan speakers has increased up to the level it used to
have in the thirties. This change appears to be the result of the implementation of
the Catalan government’s public policies oriented to promote the learning and the
use of Catalan.
Because of the coexistence of Castilian and Catalan, Catalonia is sometimes per-
ceived to be a bilingual society. Several sociolinguistic studies rather show that Cat-
alonia is characterized by diglossia rather than bilingualism (Vallverdú 1970, Strubell i
Trueta 1981, Tudela 1986, Woolard 1989). Bilingualism means that two languages
coexist and both are used regularly and indistinctly for similar functions and with
equal level of proficiency. On the contrary, diglossia happens when one language is re-
served for education, formal communication and literature and the second or diglossic
3These are the three main areas where Catalan is spoken. It should be noted that in Valencia
census data refer to “Valencian,” which is generally recognized as Catalan in Catalonia, but not
always in Valencia. Figure 1 is based on the data presented in Table 1, pp 130-131, of Vallverdú
(1990). I updated the percentages for 1991 using census data, which are available for the three areas.
For 1996 there are data only for Catalonia.
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language is used for family and ordinary life, popular culture and folklore.
The economic value of a diglossic language, expressed in the wage or employment
probability premium, is not expected to be very large. Given this situation, one
consensual objective in Catalonia has been to eliminate diglossia and move on to
bilingual society, for which active language policies increased the economic value of
knowing and using Catalan in Catalonia. This paper is the first attempt to measure
the individual’s economic value of Catalan. At this moment, data availability makes
only possible to compute this economic value in terms of employment rates, not
in terms of wages, as it is usually done. Further research will be possible, if future
employment and wage surveys in Catalonia include information on language variables.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2, presents a basic historical review
of language policies in Catalonia. Section 3 describes a model of language choice
and employment status. Section 4 discusses the data used in the estimation. Sec-
tion 5 presents the estimation results: the estimated coefficients, the predicted and
counterfactual Catalan knowledge and employment probabilities, the premium and
its marginal effects, and a comparison of these results under different specifications.
Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions of this paper.
2 Language Policy in Catalonia
There are four official languages in Spain: Castilian, Catalan, Basque and Galician.
Presently, Castilian is official in the totality of the territory, and each of the three
other languages shares co-officiality with Castilian in its own territory.4 However,
after the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), and up to the death of Franco in 1975, all
public uses of any local language other than Castilian were abolished; and, until the
Spanish Constitution was passed in 1978, the only official language anywhere in Spain
was Castilian. The interested reader can see the articles on language of the Spanish
4Altogether, around fourty percent of the population of Spain lives in areas where there are two
official languages.
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Constitution and of the Autonomy Statute for Catalonia in Appendix A.1.
In 1980 the Generalitat, the autonomous Catalan government, was re-established
and gradually recovered its pre-war competencies. At that time, Catalan language
was clearly a diglossic language. The massive immigration flows from the rest of
Spain received in the sixties, together with the decades-long absence of all public and
formal use of Catalan, had allowed diglossia to institutionalize. Moreover, a very high
proportion of the generations schooled in the period from 1939 to 1975 was not able
to read or write in Catalan, even if it was their native language. Table 1 shows a
basic chronology of some language-related historical facts.
Thus, the Generalitat actively promoted the learning and the use of Catalan at the
expense of Castilian in Catalonia. To this object, it implemented a set of regulations
and incentives with the long-term goal of having Catalan become the normal language
of public and private use in Catalonia. This is known as the “Normalization policy”
(normalització), which can be divided into two main periods:
1. From 1980 to 1990, characterized by the sensitization of the population and an
increase in the knowledge of the language. This stage depended primarily on
schools for implementation.
2. From 1990 up to today, in which the objective is to extend the social use of
Catalan.
During the first stage, a General Directorship of Linguistic Policy was created in
1980, and in 1983 the Linguistic Normalization Bill was passed unanimously in the
Catalan Parliament. This law extended the use of Catalan, particularly in the fields of
education, public administration and public media. It was the legal instrument which
allowed the progressive replacement of Castilian by Catalan as the main language
of instruction in primary, middle and secondary schools.5 The municipal Catalan
5The language of instruction in Catalan universities is not clearly determined by law. Therefore,
it is, in practice, left to the instructor’s choice.
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language services acted as the main instruments of language diffusion among the adult
population, as did the new Catalan language mass media created by the Generalitat.
See Table 2 for a description of Normalization measures.
The second stage has seen the territorial and sectorial expansion of the language
policy. In 1998, the Parliament approved a new law, which extends the presence of
Catalan in previously not regulated domains, such as privately owned media, cultural
industries or the socioeconomic sphere. Measures in each of these respective domains
are: a minimum percentage of broadcast time in Catalan, quotas on cinematographic
distribution and showings, and specific regulations to promote the use of Catalan
in publicly owned enterprises, public service enterprises, customer service, consumer
information, publicity and professional activity.
In sum, these public policies, absent or weaker in other Catalan areas, seem to
account for the recovery of Catalan language in Catalonia depicted in Figure 2. In
the next section, I set up a model to determine an individual’s Catalan knowledge
and to what extent this knowledge influences his or her employment status.
3 Model
The model proposed in this section is tailored to the available data.6 Knowing a
language means an economic reward, but it also implies directly a satisfaction, con-
ditional on contextual factors like family background and language most used in the
community. As Willis & Rosen (1979), I proceed in two stages: one in which selection
into knowing the language is determined depending on economic and non-economic
incentives, and a second one in which economic rewards are realized conditional on
individuals’ characteristics.
Consider an individual whose utility depends on the expected economic value
EVc, if she shows Catalan and on EVn, if she does not. Let α be an individ-
6For a model which incorporates marriage markets, language choice, and earnings outcomes see
Robinson (1988).
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ual’s non-economic reward for knowing Catalan. She chooses to know Catalan to
max {EVc + α, EVn}. After deciding whether to know Catalan or not, the individual
goes to the job market where she can become employed or unemployed. Employers
only hire individuals whose value exceeds a certain threshold, which is normalized to
zero, that is, employers max [Vj, 0], j = {c, n}, where Vc is the individual’s value if
she know’s Catalan and Vn is the value if she does not know Catalan. Let the vector
of attributes X determine the economic value for each language knowledge:
Vc = Xβc + uc, uc ∼ N
³
0,σ2c
´
, (1)
Vn = Xβn + un, un ∼ N
³
0,σ2n
´
, (2)
where cov(uc, un) = 0. The non-economic value of Catalan knowledge depends on a
vector of attributes Z:
α = Zδ + ε, ε ∼ N
³
0,σ2
´
,
where, in general, cov (ε, uj) 6= 0, j = {c, n}. Define the difference between the
total expected value of knowing and of not knowing Catalan as I = EVc + α−EVn.
Substituting the above definitions into this expression yields the following reduced
form:
I = X (βc − βn) + Zδ + ε, (3)
This selection rule determines whether the individual knows Catalan or not. Let y1
be an indicator variable assuming the values:
y1 =



1, if I > 0, the individual knows Catalan, and
0, if I ≤ 0, the individual does not know Catalan.
Let X1 = [X|Z] and β01 = [β0c − β0n|δ0], Φ (·) is the univariate cumulative nor-
mal function, then a simple probit estimation consists in maximizing the likelihood
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function
lnL (β1|X1) =
X
[y1 lnΦ (X1β1) + (1− y1) lnΦ (−X1β1)] ,
thereby obtaining the reduced form parameters of the selection equation cβ1σε .
To perform the second stage estimation, the employment equation, let the differ-
ence in predicted value be bI = X1bβ1. Estimating the probability of being employed
directly from Equation (1) and from Equation (2) would produce a selection bias, be-
cause the subset of individuals who know and do not know Catalan is not a random
sample of the population. I use the selection equation (3) in a conditional likelihood
estimation. Let y2 be an indicator variable assuming the values:
y2 =



1, if Vj > 0, the individual is employed, and
0, if Vj ≤ 0, the individual is not employed.
The log-likelihood functions for employment status conditional on knowing Catalan
and on not knowing Catalan are
lnL (βc, ρc|X) =
Xh
y2 lnΦ2
³
Xβc, bI, ρc´+ (1− y2) lnΦ2 ³−Xβc, bI,−ρc´− lnΦ ³bI´i , and
lnL (βn, ρn|X) =
Xh
y2 lnΦ2
³
Xβn,−bI,−ρn´+ (1− y2) lnΦ2 ³−Xβc,−bI, ρc´− lnΦ ³−bI´i ,
where Φ2 (·) is the bivariate cumulative normal function. Parameters bβc and bρc andbβn and bρn are the respective maximizers of these two conditional functions, con-
structed over the two different samples. With these estimated parameters I compute
the relevant counterfactuals and with them the employment probability premium for
knowing Catalan for each individual:
∆ = E (y2|X,X1, y1 = 1)−E (y2|X,X1, y1 = 0) = Pc − Pn,
where Pc =
Φ2(Xbβc,X1bβ1,bρc)
Φ(X1bβ1) and Pn = Φ2(Xbβn,−X1bβ1,−bρn)Φ(−X1bβ1) . The average Catalan premium
is then ∆ = N−1Σ∆ = P c − P n, where P c = N−1ΣPc and P n = N−1ΣPn. The
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premium’s variance7 is
V ar
³
∆
´
= N−1
³
N−1Σ∆2 −∆2
´
+
∂∆
∂bβ1
0
V ar
³bβ1´ ∂∆∂bβ1+d0cV ar
³bβc, bρc´ dc+d0nV ar ³bβn, bρn´ dn,
where d0c =
·
∂P c
∂bβc 0, ∂P c∂bρc 0
¸
and d0n =
·
−∂Pn
∂bβn 0,−∂Pn∂bρn 0
¸
. Given that employment parameters
by Catalan knowledge are computed separately, they are independent. Marginal
effects of a given covariate in the premium are computed as a difference-in-differences
of the predicted conditional probabilities of employment. Hence, marginal effects are
defined as the effect of a given (not an infinitesimal) increase in a determined variable
on the conditional probability of being employed. Further details on this computation
are given in Appendix A.2.
4 Data
Data come from the Catalan and Spanish National Statistical Institutes (IDESCAT-
INE). This is the only data source in Spain that includes a question on language
knowledge. I use two samples of 250 000 randomly selected individuals each from
census data for years 1991 and 1996. Available variables are personal attributes such
as gender, age, marital status, schooling, place of residence, place of birth, number of
years in Catalonia, occupational status and knowledge of Catalan. Unfortunately, in
this sample there is no way relate individuals across time or to use family level infor-
mation, that is, to link two individuals of the same family, which can be interesting
for analyzing the influence of parents’ Catalan knowledge on their children. I select
the main household members, that is, only parents and children, who are between
16 and 60 years old, born in Spain and who are in the labor force. Notice that this
last condition is particularly important for women, as their participation rate is lower
than men’s. Individuals for whom there is no information on their level of Catalan
7I thank Manuel Arellano for his suggestions on computing this variance.
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knowledge or for whom their arrival year is not available, if they were born outside
of Catalonia, are excluded from the sample. The selected sample consists of 96 863
individuals for year 1991, and of 96 985 for 1996. Appendix A.3. gives further details
on the sample selection.
In the census data the level of Catalan knowledge is self-assessed;8 the respondent
has to cross with an X the statement that applies:
1. R. (respondent) understands it.
2. R. does not understand it.
3. R. understands and reads it
4. R. speaks it.
5. R. speaks and reads it.
6. R. speaks, reads and writes it.
In the survey’s instructions the interviewer has the following definitions to orient
the respondent:
1. Somebody ‘understands’ Catalan when s/he is able to understand a
conversation about any topic in Catalan.
2. Somebody ‘reads’ Catalan when s/he is able to read texts such as signs,
newspapers’ news, etc.
3. Somebody ‘speaks’ Catalan when s/he is able to maintain a conversa-
tion about a current topic.
4. Somebody ‘writes’ Catalan when s/he is able to write notes, letters,
etc. with enough, not necessarily total, accuracy.
This variable is, thus, subjective and only informative about the potential use of
Catalan language by the individual. I divide the level of Catalan knowledge in three
levels:
1. Basic level: Understanding, reading or speaking.
2. Reading and Speaking.
3. Writing.
8Unfortunately, as Charette & Meng (1994) point out, self-assessed data can lead to biased
inference. Future research on the subject may be based on language tests and on earnings data.
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For each year I construct two subsamples according to gender for the following
variables: Catalan knowledge and employment status, the dependent variables; the
explanatory variables in the language and in the employment estimation, the X vari-
ables, and the explanatory variables only in the language estimation, the Z variables.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by subsample and by variable. Appen-
dix A.4. explains the definition of these variables in further detail. From 1991 to
1996 both men and women appeared to have improved their level of Catalan knowl-
edge, being women in both years were more proficient in Catalan than men. While
in 1991 38% of men and 30% of women knew Catalan at a basic level, in 1996 these
percentages dropped to only 26% for men and 19% for women. This descriptive evi-
dence should be taken cautiously, because these are different samples. As it is shown
in the next section, an improvement in Catalan knowledge is observed, even after
accounting for the variation in the samples.
This general improvement in Catalan proficiency from 1991 to 1996 coincided with
a worsening of labor market conditions: employment rates dropped for everybody,
ranging the decline between 4 and 5 percentage points. However, looking at the
employment rates by levels of Catalan knowledge, one can see that the basic shape
is persistent. In both years employment rates are substantially higher for men who
read and speak Catalan than for those who do not. Men who write Catalan have
slightly lower employment rates than men who only read and speak Catalan. For
women, in contrast, employment rates are monotonically increasing in the level of
Catalan knowledge. Notice also that individuals who were not born in Catalonia do
not exhibit substantially different employment rates than average employment rates.
The X variables are schooling, age, a dummy indicating whether the individual
was affected by the Normalization policy, marital status, residence variables and
Municipal variables. For both genders, years of schooling increased from year 1991 to
1996; women, however, show more schooling and are younger than men. The average
age in the sample is 38 for men and around 35 for men. A dummy variable indicates
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whether the individual was affected by the ‘Normalization’ process: if the individual
was younger than 12 years old in 1984, this dummy takes the value of one and is zero
otherwise. Understandably, there is a higher percentage of individuals affected by the
Normalization in 1996 than in 1991. In the sample there is a higher percentage of
married men than women; however, from 1991 to 1996 marriage rates of both genders
decrease. Most of the population of Catalonia resides in the province of Barcelona.
The provinces of Lleida, Girona and Tarragona concentrate, respectively, 5.6, 8.5, and
8% of individuals in the sample.
I also use average data at the district area called municipi, a smaller unit than
the comarques. These data are assigned to each individual in the samples: out of 945
municipis in Catalonia, the sample of 1991 covers 943 municipis while the sample
of 1996 covers 944. There is, however, a high concentration of individuals, almost
one fourth of each sample, in the municipi of Barcelona. Municipal variables are
the percentage of employed in the total population (PartM), the percentage of em-
ployment in services (ServM), the percentage of people who write Catalan (WriteM),
the percentage of people born in Catalonia (CbornM). At the municipi the average
employment rate is around 36%, while the percentage of employment in services is
52% in 1991 and 58% in 1996. These variables capture the externality effect of the
community on individuals’ employment status, and as such are classed asX variables.
The percentage of people who write Catalan in the municipi is 40% in 1991 and 46%
in 1996. People born in Catalonia amount around two thirds of the Municipal popu-
lation. These two variables reflect the externality effect of the community on Catalan
knowledge, and are therefore Z variables.
Additional Z variables are indicators of origin and of migration. As shown above,
people born outside Catalonia do not exhibit notorious differences in their employ-
ment rates with the average employment rates. However, as it will be clear in the
next section, origin has an important effect in Catalan knowledge. Approximately
one third of the sample consists of people born outside Catalonia. Around one third
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of them arrived when they were no older than 10 years, and more than two thirds
of the people born outside of Catalonia come from Andalusia. A very reduced pro-
portion of individuals in the sample were born in Valencia, in the Balearics and in
La Franja (three provinces of Aragon were Catalan is widely used), areas outside
Catalonia were Catalan is also official. For individuals born outside of Catalonia an
important variable is the time that they have spent in Catalonia, which is captured
by the variable YSM (Years since migration). One can see that in 1991 they spent
on average between 23 and 25 years in Catalonia, reflecting that on average people
arrived to Catalonia at the end of the sixties.
5 Estimation Results
This section discusses the results of the estimations in two stages and the computation
of the premium and marginal effects described in Section 3. I perform two different
estimations of the probability of knowing Catalan. The first one defines that an
individual ‘knows’ Catalan, if she at least reads and speaks Catalan, otherwise she is
defined as not knowing it; in a second definition, knowing Catalan means being able
to write it.
5.1 Catalan Knowledge
Table 4 reports the coefficients of the selection equation into reading and speaking
Catalan on the left side and into writing Catalan on the right side. The covariates
used in the estimations are the X and Z variables discussed in the previous section.
The X variables include square terms for schooling and age and an interaction term
for schooling and age; and the Z variables include an interaction term for A9 and
YSM.
There are some clear common features in the estimated coefficients for the four
The Catalan Premium. Sílvio Rendon. July 2003 15
subsamples.9 For both skills, the effect of years schooling is positive and significant but
with decreasing returns. Age tends to have a positive effect on reading and speaking
Catalan, but a negative effect on writing Catalan, that is, younger people are less
likely to read and speak Catalan but more likely to write Catalan. The interaction of
age and schooling has a negative effect on the probability of knowing Catalan. These
negative interaction is shown to be stronger for writing skills than for reading and
speaking skills. The coefficient of the Normalization dummy is positive for all groups,
greater in 1991 than in 1996 for both genders, greater for men than for women, and
greater for reading and speaking than for writing skills. This positive coefficient means
that the shape of Catalan knowledge in age is first decreasing and then increasing.
Married individuals, of both genders and for both census year, are in general less
likely to know Catalan. The coefficients for the three provinces other than Barcelona
are positive and significant and greater for reading and speaking than for writing
skills. The effects of the local employment rate are positive for reading and speaking
but negative for writing Catalan, while the percentage of services at the Municipal
level is in general negative. This result may reflect that both variables may have high
values in relatively more urban areas where Catalan is relatively less used than in
rural areas.
The percentage of people who write Catalan and the percentage of people born
in Catalonia in the municipi are indicators of social interactions between individuals
at the local level, which play also an important role in explaining Catalan knowl-
edge. The more people know Catalan in the municipi, the more likely it is that one
individual knows it. A higher percentage of people born in Catalonia in the mu-
nicipi increases the probability that an individual reads and speaks Catalan, but,
interestingly, it decreases the probability that an individual writes Catalan.
Not being born in Catalonia has a negative effect on both Catalan skills, especially
9I also estimated a probit with fixed effects for the municipis and an ordered probit with three
categories for each profficiency level: basic knowledge, reading and speaking, and writing Catalan.
Results are essentially the same as those shown here.
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on reading and speaking Catalan. However, having arrived to Catalonia at a young
age has a significant positive effect. For individuals who are not born in Catalonia,
years since migration (YSM) has an important positive effect, which is increasing
from 1991 to 1996 for both reading and speaking and for writing skills. More exposure
to the local culture makes language assimilation more likely. The interaction between
YSM and having arrived at a young age shows a negative coefficient. Individuals who
were born in Andalusia are less likely to know Catalan, especially women for whom
the effect is relatively big and strongly significant; for men this effect is relatively
small and non-significant. On the contrary, individuals born in areas were Catalan
is strongly used, such as Valencia, Balearics and La Franja, are more likely to know
Catalan.
5.2 Gender Gap and Improvement in Catalan Knowledge
After performing these estimations, I evaluate two counterfactual experiments: switch-
ing years, which allows me to measure to what extent the observed increase in the
probability of knowing Catalan is driven by an actual improvement in its knowledge.
Given that the sample of 1991 is different than the sample of 1996, one can mea-
sure the probability, say, that an individual from the sample of 1991 speaks Catalan
in 1996. I perform a similar counterfactual experiment for gender, thus measuring to
what extent the gender differences in Catalan knowledge are driven by attributes or
by the gender-specific estimated coefficients.
Table 5 reports the predicted probability of knowing Catalan by proficiency level,
census year, and gender with the two mentioned experiments. One can see that for
men there is no significant increase Catalan knowledge from 1991 to 1996, although
in the descriptive statistics one can see an increase of more than 10 percentage points:
from 62% to 74% for reading and speaking and from 37% to 46% for writing. This
means that this large increase in mainly explained by changing individual attributes
in the sample. For women there is a significant increase in Catalan knowledge, how-
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ever not as large as a first inspection of the data suggests. By the same type of
decomposition, controlling for individual attributes, it is clear that women are more
likely to read and speak and to write Catalan than men. This gender difference
is greater for writing skills than for reading and speaking skills. In the absence of
panel data, these results remarks the need for distinguishing between attributes and
estimated coefficients when discussing differences in Catalan knowledge over time or
across genders.
5.3 Employment by Catalan Knowledge
The second stage consists of estimating the probability of finding a job conditional
on a given Catalan proficiency level using the parameters of the selection equation
previously estimated. Tables 6 and 7 show the conditional probit estimations of the
probability of being employed for the subsamples characterized by census year, origin,
gender and reading-speaking and writing skills.
These estimations use only X variables as covariates. Schooling and age tend
both to have a positive and decreasing effect on employment for most groups. The
coefficient of the interaction between these two variables has in general a negative
effect on employment. The Normalization dummy, shown to be important in the
Catalan knowledge equation, is non-significant for all subsamples.
The effect of being married in the probability of being employed is positive and
significant for men, whereas it is smaller and even negative for women. Residents of
Lleida, Girona and Tarragona exhibit in general higher employment rates than those
who reside in Barcelona. A higher percentage of employed people in the municipi has
a positive effect on the individual probability of being employed, whereas the percent-
age of people working in services in the municipi, probably capturing urbanization,
has a negative effect.
Notice also that the correlation coefficient is generally not zero, showing that
the employment equation is not independent from the selection equation. Interest-
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ingly, the estimations exhibit negative correlation for individuals who know Catalan
and positive correlation for those who do not know it. I also perform simple probit
estimations for the employment equation and compute likelihood ratios which are
significant for most subsamples, that is, one can reject the null hypothesis that the
selection and the employment equation are independent.
5.4 Premium
Table 8 shows the predicted probabilities of being employed by Catalan reading and
speaking and writing skills based on the previous estimations. Notice that predictions
are very close to the actual values. This table also reports counterfactual probabilities:
the probability of being employed for individuals who do not know Catalan had they
known it, and the probability of being employed for individuals who know Catalan
had they not known it. With the counterfactuals, I compute the premium for knowing
Catalan, that is, its contribution to being employed for the different subsamples. I
also compute the counterfactual premia resulting of switching attributes by gender
and by year. This table reveals that
1. the premium for reading and speaking Catalan is around 3% for men
and around 5% for women; the premium for writing is around 1% for men
and around 4% for women;
2. for both genders, for both years, and for both proficiency levels, the
premium is greater for people who know Catalan than for people who do
not know it;
3. for both genders, the difference in the premium between people who
know Catalan and people who do not know Catalan is greater in 1996
than in 1991;
4. for both genders and for both years, the premium is greater for speaking
and reading than for writing Catalan.
5. for both years and for both proficiency levels, the premium is greater
for women than for men;
6. for both genders, except for men who read and speak Catalan and for
both proficiency levels, the premium falls from 1991 to 1996.
The Catalan Premium. Sílvio Rendon. July 2003 19
The first finding shows that the premium is significant and relatively large, al-
though it is smaller than the one computed by a descriptive direct comparison across
samples. The second finding indicates that individuals that have a higher economic
reward of knowing Catalan do actually know Catalan; those having a lower economic
reward, do actually not know it. Note, however, that the economic reward for both
groups is positive. The theory of comparative advantage predicts that individuals
with positive rewards for knowing Catalan will actually know Catalan, if individu-
als only care for economic rewards. That means that the economic incentive is not
enough to explain individuals’ decisions on language knowledge. Additionally, given
that the premium is larger for individuals who know Catalan, one can argue that this
premium is measured in a transitional phase, when individuals are increasing their
level of Catalan knowledge. One would expect that measuring the premium at a
later stage of the Normalization process conforms closer to the theory of comparative
advantage. The third finding gives evidence in that direction: in 1991 the difference
in the premium for reading and speaking Catalan between people who know and who
do not know Catalan is around 1% for men and around 2.5% for women; in 1996 the
difference in the premium for the sample of 1991 would be 2% for men and around
5% for women.
The fourth finding can be interpreted as evidence for decreasing returns in the
level of Catalan knowledge: the premium is higher for a reading and speaking than
for a writing proficiency level. The fifth finding means that women, besides having
a higher probability of knowing Catalan, have also a larger premium. This result
should be taken cautiously because, as mentioned in Section 4, the sample includes
only individuals who participate in the labor force. Women’s estimated premium
may be large because their participation rate is lower than men’s. Accounting for
participation decisions is beyond the scope of this paper and it is left for further
research. The sixth finding means that the premium is decreasing over time, which
can be also interpreted as evidence for decreasing returns in Catalan knowledge. As
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people are more proficient in Catalan over time, knowing Catalan makes less of a
difference for being employed.
5.5 Marginal Effects on the Premium
The premium computed above is an average for each census year and gender, but it
is obviously different for each individual. A way of accounting for different individual
attributes is to compute the marginal effects of each covariate on the premium. A
variable’s direct effect influences the premium through the employment equation,
whereas an indirect effect affects the premium through the selection equation. Only
X variables have both direct and indirect effects.
Table 9 and Table 10 report the direct and indirect marginal effects of each variable
on the Catalan premium. As in the previous subsection, the average premium of
reading and speaking Catalan is around 3% for men and around 5% for women; the
premium for writing is around 1% for men and around 4% for women. Direct effects of
age and of schooling on the premium are negative, while indirect effects are positive,
being the direct effects predominant. For the Normalization dummy, the direct effect
is negative but not significant, while the indirect effect is positive and significant;
the total effect of this variable is negative. The marriage variable exhibits a marked
difference by gender: for men the direct effect is negative and significant, while the
indirect effect is not significant; for women the direct effect is not significant, but the
indirect effect is negative and significant. Individuals who live in Lleida, Girona and
Tarragona exhibit negative direct effects and positive indirect effects on the premium,
being the indirect effect predominant. The employment rate and the percentage of
services in employment have both a negative direct effect and a positive indirect effect,
being the total effect negative.
The Z variables, which only enter in the selection equation, have only indirect
effects. Individuals who live in municipis with a higher percentage of Catalan-writers
and Catalan-born individuals have a significant and larger positive premium than
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those who do not. Individuals who were not born in Catalonia have a significantly
smaller premium than those who were born in Catalonia. Among those individuals
who were not born in Catalonia, those who arrived a young age, who have more time
in Catalonia, and who were born in Catalan-speaking areas have a higher premium.
Individuals born in Andalusia have a smaller premium.
5.6 Premium and Effects with Alternative Specifications
This section discusses how sensitive are these results to the Z variables. A recursive
bivariate probit model, such as the one used here, is not identified without exogenous
sources of variation, that is, only withX variables, which determine both employment
status and language choice (Maddala 1983). The introduction of Z variables breaks
the ambiguity and pins down the parameters of the language selection equation and
the employment equation. Discussions on bivariate probit results are thus focused
on the meaning and quality of these variables, for example, the discussion on the
effect of Catholic schools on College attendance (Neal 1997, Evans & Schwab 1995,
Altonji, Elder & Taber 2002). A matter of concern is that the estimated premium
is a spurious result of unmeasured individual characteristics that are correlated with
employment. This section follows the discussion of Altonji et al. (2002) who compare
estimates of different specifications of a bivariate probit model. This comparison is
basically heuristic, given that models of limited dependent variables, which do not
have estimated sample errors, do not have established tests of instruments, as it is
the case with linear models.
Table 11 presents the premium10 for all groups by knowledge, proficiency level of
Catalan and by exclusion of Z variables. One can compare the baseline estimation
without any exclusion, the estimation with no Municipal variables (percentage of
people born in Catalonia and percentage of people who write Catalan in themunicipi),
10Variations in the premium come basically from variations in the counterfactual employment
probability. The predicted employment probability is close to the actual one and does not vary more
than 0.01% across specifications. It is thus enough to report the premium.
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and the estimation with no origin variables (born in Catalonia, A9, YSM, A9×YSM,
born in Andalusia, Valencia-Balearics, Franja).
The exclusion of Municipal variables means a reduction of the average premium
for men, except for writing Catalan in 1996, and a reduction of the average premium
for women in 1991 and an increase in 1996. For most cases, it also implies a reduction
in the gap between people who know and who do not know Catalan, although it does
not change the result that the former have a higher premium than the latter. Notice
also that there is a mild increase in the standard deviation of the premium for all
groups.
If origin variables are excluded, the average premium for reading and speaking
Catalan decreases for men and increases for women, while it increases for both gen-
ders for writing Catalan. Variations introduced by this exclusion are substantially
larger than those produced by the previous one, not only in the premium by Catalan
knowledge, but also in the estimates’ precisions.
Table 12 reports the marginal effects for two selected variables, schooling and age,
by exclusion restriction. As in the previous table, larger variations in effects and larger
standard deviations occur when origin variables are excluded. Note that direct and
indirect effects exhibit large variations across specifications, but total effects do not.
Understandably, changing the set of Z variables redistributes total marginal effects
between direct and indirect effects. This is clearer for schooling, whose marginal
effects exhibit large variations, than for age, whose indirect effects do not variate
much. For both proficiency levels the exclusion of Municipal variables reduces slightly
the indirect effects of schooling, whereas the exclusion of origin variables produces an
important increase in the indirect effects of schooling.
In short, the estimated premium and its marginal effects are shown to be sensitive
to exclusion restrictions, in particular, of origin variables, which are the primary
source of identification of the premium.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper I find evidence that the returns to reading, speaking and writing Catalan
are positive for men and women for census years 1991 and 1996. Accounting for the
selection into knowing Catalan, I find that speaking and reading Catalan increases the
probability of being employed by between 3 and 5 percentage points, whereas writing
Catalan increases the probability of being employed by between 1 and 4 percentage
points. The premium is greater for women than for men, and decreasing in years of
schooling and in age. It is positive both for individuals who know Catalan and for
those who do not know it, although it is higher for the former than for the latter. This
finding conforms partly to the theory of comparative advantage, that is, individuals
with higher economic returns to knowing Catalan actually know it. However, it may
also indicate that (i) non-economic incentives are very important and (ii) that the
process of Normalization, along with the progressive Catalan recovery, was still going
on in 1991 and 1996.
These results encourage research on language and labor market behavior, even
when labor data are very scarce and the researcher is forced to rely on census data.
In this paper returns to language are measured as a difference of employment prob-
abilities, a premium; yet they are found to be significant and show sensible trends.
Measurement of these returns in terms of wages, as it is done in other contexts, is
left for future research, when employment and wage surveys in Catalonia include
questions on language proficiency.
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Appendix
A.1. Legal Status of Catalan
The following are translations of articles related to language in Catalonia from the
Spanish Constitution and from the Autonomy Statute for Catalonia. They are taken
from Webber & Strubell i Trueta (1991).
Spanish Constitution (1978). Article 3:
1. Castilian is the official language of the State. All Spaniards have the duty
to know it and the right to use it.
2. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Au-
tonomous Communities, in accordance with their Statutes.
3. The richness of Spain’s different linguistic modalities is a cultural patri-
mony which will be the object of special respect and protection.
Autonomy Statute for Catalonia (1979). Article 3:
1. Catalonia’s own language is Catalan.
2. The Catalan language is the official one in Catalonia, as is Castilian,
official throughout the Spanish State.
3. The Generalitat will guarantee the normal and official use of both lan-
guages, will take the necessary measures to ensure adequate knowledge of
them and will create the conditions which will allow them to attain full
equality with respect to the rights and duties of the citizens of Catalonia.
A.2. Marginal Effects
I compute the marginal effects as a difference-in-differences of the conditional proba-
bilities of being employed. Let X2 = X, then the direct and indirect marginal effects
of Xk variables are
∆kj = ∆|Xkj+θj − ∆|Xkj = (Pc − Pn)|Xkj+θj − (Pc − Pn)|Xkj ,
where ∆|Xkj+θj = (Pc − Pn)|Xkj+θj is the premium when the j-th variable of Xk, Xkj,
is replaced by Xkj + θj, if it is continuous, and by Xkj = 1, if it is a dummy; and
∆|Xkj = (Pc − Pn)|Xkj is the premium, if Xkj is continuous, and it is the premium
when Xkj is replaced by Xkj = 0, if it is a dummy; k = {1, 2}. For k = 2, effects
are direct; for k = 1, effects are indirect. The continuous variables are schooling, age,
YSM, and local-level percentages. For the local-level percentages the increase is one
percentage point, that is, θj = 0.01; for all the other variables the increase is one,
θj = 1. Given that in the estimation there are covariates which are linked together,
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such as square and interaction terms, a particular marginal effect for one of these
covariates is determined by several terms and coefficients.
The average marginal effects are then ∆kj = N−1Σ∆kj, that is, I compute average
marginal effects, not marginal effects at the average of the covariates, as it sometimes
appears in the literature. The variances of the average direct marginal effects are
V ar
³
∆2j
´
= N−1
³
N−1Σ∆22j −∆
2
2j
´
+ d0cjV ar
³bβc, bρc´ dcj + d0njV ar ³bβn, bρn´ dnj,
where d0aj =
·
∂Pa
∂bβaj 0, ∂Pa∂bρa 0
¸¯¯¯¯
X2j+θj
−
·
∂Pa
∂bβaj 0, ∂Pa∂bρa 0
¸¯¯¯¯
X2j
, a = {c, n}. As said in the main
text, these two sets of parameters were computed independently, so there is no cor-
relation between them. The variances of the average indirect marginal effects are
V ar
³
∆1j
´
= N−1
³
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2
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´
+ d01jV ar
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−
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¶¯¯¯¯
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, that is, it is the derivative of a
difference-in-differences of conditional probabilities.
The derivatives of the individual predicted probabilities of employment conditional
on Catalan knowledge with respect to each coefficient - see Greene (1996, 1998) - are
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The average derivatives required to compute the previous variances are just the av-
erage of these expressions over all individuals.
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A.3. Sample Selection
The following table illustrates the importance of the selection criteria in constructing
the sample.
1991 1996
Total sample 250 000 250 000
Only main household members: parents and children -17 654 -17 903
Only individuals between 16 and 60 years old -82 297 -81 770
Only Spaniards -5 740 -4 745
Only if arrival in Catalonia available -3 788
Only individuals in the labor force -47 421 -44 809
Only if Catalan language variable available -25
Selected sample 96 863 96 985
A.4. Definition of the variables
The explanation on the construction of each variable is presented below.
Employment.- The census reports a variable called “relationship with the ac-
tivity.” Somebody is employed if he or she reports to be working; somebody
is unemployed, if he or she reports to be not working and looking for his/her
first job or having worked before. Individuals who report other options (mil-
itary service, retired, student, working at home) are not in the sample.
Schooling.- The census reports the maximum level of studies attained by the
individual. To each level, I assign the number of years of schooling.
Age.- It is the census year, 1991 or 1996, respectively, minus the year of birth.
Normalization.- If the individual was younger than 12 years old in 1984, this
dummy variable takes the value of one and zero otherwise.
Married.- This variable takes the value of one, if the respondent reports to
be currently married; it is zero if the respondent reports to be a widow(er),
separated, or divorced.
Residence variables.- The census reports the municipi and the Province of
residence for each individual. With this information I construct dummies for
Lleida, Girona and Tarragona.
Origin variables.-The census reports the municipi and the province of birth
for each individual. With this information I construct dummies for people
who are not born in Catalonia, Andalusia, Valencia, Balearics and La Franja.
YSM (Years since Migration).- The census reports the year of arrival to
Catalonia. YSM is the census year minus this number. I also construct the
dummy indicating if somebody arrived when s/he was no more than 9 years
old.
Municipal variables.- I use the residence variable to assign to each individual
the corresponding information of the municipi.
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Table 1: Historical Facts
• 1716. Decree of Nova Planta. Castilian comes to be the only official language.
• 1858. Law of Public Instruction. Castilian as compulsory language of instruction.
• 1860. Catalan is still the habitual language in the rural and urban areas.
• 1923. Primo de Rivera: Suppression of Catalan.
• 1931. Spanish Republic: Abolition of dictates against Catalan.
Co-officiality of Catalan and Castilian. However, Catalan is the official
language of the Catalan government, schools and media.
• Post Civil War years. Linguistic Repression.
- Institutionalization of diglossia: dialectization of Catalan
in the consciousness of its speakers.
- Abolition of all public uses of Catalan.
- Closing of schools and institutions.
- Penalties, fines and loss of positions for Catalan speakers.
- No mass media in Catalan (TV, radio and journals).
• Post Civil War years. Massive immigration of non-Catalan speakers.
- In 1970, 40% of the population of Catalonia was non-native born.
- In 1975, Catalan speakers represented 31.0% of high school dropouts;
Castilian speakers, 68.8%.
- In the same year 62.30% of the people with university studies
were Catalan speakers; Castilian speakers, 35.7%.
Source: Woolard (1989)
Table 2: Law of 1983
Catalan and Castilian are both official in Catalonia.
Declared Goals:
1. to have Catalan be the most widely spoken language
in private and public organisms, and in all those public usages;
2. respecting the rights of Castilian speakers.
The first phase of normalization focuses in 3 areas of action:
(i) Official Use. Catalan government.
- Catalan is the language of the Generalitat (together with Castilian).
2 year transition period.
- Official documents must be published both in Catalan and Castilian.
- Administrative procedures in Catalan are valid, as are in Castilian.
(ii) Pre-college education.
- Primary education in the usual language of the child.
- Catalan must be compulsorily taught in all pre-university studies.
- All teachers should know both official languages.
(iii) Mass media.
- Incentives for using Catalan in mass media (TV, radio).
- Subsidies to regular publications written totally or partially in Catalan.
- Incentives given to theater and books in Catalan.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Census Year 1991 1996
Gender Men Wom. Men Wom.
Catalan Knowledge
% Basic level 37.7 29.5 26.3 18.5
% Speak&Read 25.8 22.9 27.5 22.4
% Write 36.5 47.6 46.2 59.1
Employment
%Employed 89.9 78.5 85.1 74.5
%Employed by Catalan Knowledge
Basic level 87.8 72.3 81.9 68.0
Speak & Read 92.0 78.5 87.3 73.3
Write 91.0 82.5 85.6 77.0
%Employed for not born in Catalonia 91.0 77.0 86.3 74.2
X variables
Schooling (S) 7.7 8.3 8.6 9.2
Age 38.0 34.4 38.2 35.5
% Normalization (Norm) 3.9 5.0 13.0 15.9
% Married 66.6 58.2 62.8 57.4
% Lleida 5.7 5.0 5.9 5.2
% Girona 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.7
% Tarragona 8.9 7.7 9.4 8.5
% employed over population in municipi (PartM) 37.2 37.4 36.3 36.3
% work in Services in municipi (ServM) 51.7 52.5 57.4 58.2
Z variables
% writes in municipi (WriteM) 39.7 40.1 45.6 45.9
% Catalan-born in municipi (CatbornM) 67.1 67.2 68.2 68.1
% not born in Catalonia (NbornC) 37.6 30.2 31.0 24.9
% arrived age ≤ 9 (A9) 11.0 11.1 10.0 9.6
Years since migration (YSM) if not born in Cat 25.0 23.6 28.4 26.8
% born in Andalusia (And) 24.1 18.3 19.5 14.4
% born in Valencia (PV) 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9
% born in Balearics 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
% born in Franja (Franja) 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Nobs 60446 36417 57785 39200
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Table 4: Reduced-form Catalan Knowledge Equation. Standard errors in small fonts
Catalan Skill Reading and Speaking Writing
Census Year 1991 1996 1991 1996
Gender Men Wom. Men Wom. Men Wom. Men Wom.
Const. -3.98 -4.16 -4.17 -4.08 -1.56 -1.49 -0.73 -1.30
0.17 0.24 0.22 0.30 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.24
Schooling (S) 3.54 3.85 4.39 4.81 3.75 4.13 4.42 4.84
×10−1 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.18
S2 -7.64 -9.02 -9.60 -11.36 -6.75 -8.76 -7.01 -9.70
×10−3 0.34 0.49 0.57 0.77 0.31 0.44 0.55 0.70
Age 6.19 6.69 2.84 3.03 -3.68 -4.33 -10.26 -9.35
×10−2 0.53 0.73 0.70 0.96 0.50 0.65 0.62 0.80
Age2 -3.96 -4.60 0.05 -0.34 6.91 7.18 13.99 12.29
×10−4 0.59 0.83 0.78 1.09 0.57 0.76 0.71 0.92
Age×S -2.12 -2.00 -2.66 -2.56 -2.73 -2.08 -3.56 -2.72
×10−1 0.18 0.27 0.23 0.32 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.26
Norm 3.48 3.00 3.10 2.96 1.81 1.66 0.03 1.05
×10−1 0.38 0.45 0.36 0.46 0.35 0.41 0.30 0.37
Married -8.76 -120.37 13.86 -83.05 -196.58 -202.38 -120.14 -182.60
×10−3 17.09 19.87 17.98 21.12 16.30 18.17 15.79 17.56
Lleida 2.63 1.69 1.15 0.91 1.12 1.65 1.39 1.21
×10−1 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.54 0.29 0.39 0.29 0.39
Girona 2.35 2.42 2.39 1.63 1.68 1.98 2.68 1.46
×10−1 0.26 0.36 0.31 0.42 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.31
Tarragona 1.62 2.10 2.16 1.48 1.28 1.34 1.83 1.45
×10−1 0.24 0.34 0.25 0.35 0.23 0.31 0.22 0.28
PartM 7.43 7.85 7.67 5.42 -7.75 -12.64 -9.74 -5.08
× 10−1 3.68 5.13 3.46 4.69 3.35 4.55 2.92 3.79
ServM -7.75 -7.31 -3.78 -4.55 -9.76 -10.36 -9.69 -7.86
×10−1 0.57 0.76 0.68 0.89 0.54 0.69 0.59 0.73
WriteM 2.71 2.41 2.74 2.30 3.90 3.64 4.01 3.48
0.11 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.16
CatbornM 8.55 11.37 12.43 15.56 -8.25 -4.72 -5.46 -1.25
×10−1 1.11 1.64 1.33 1.96 1.03 1.43 1.10 1.49
NbornC -1.86 -1.71 -1.99 -1.77 -1.40 -1.34 -1.57 -1.39
0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
A9 8.14 8.41 9.83 9.93 4.49 5.39 8.36 8.37
× 10−1 0.65 0.84 0.79 1.03 0.75 0.93 0.86 1.04
YSM 1.56 1.46 1.94 1.60 0.88 1.03 1.40 1.32
×10−2 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.22
A9×YSM -7.35 -9.28 -11.23 -13.91 -2.47 -6.49 -11.77 -14.04
×10−3 2.13 2.99 2.34 3.19 2.58 3.49 2.66 3.40
Andalusia -1.45 -10.58 -6.10 -8.16 -1.28 -5.58 -3.79 -9.69
×10−2 2.11 2.93 2.30 3.08 2.80 3.57 2.95 3.53
PV-Balearics 2.31 1.59 1.87 3.39 2.86 0.62 2.49 1.54
×10−1 0.55 0.75 0.64 0.87 0.61 0.79 0.64 0.79
Franja 3.04 5.83 2.44 3.80 3.02 3.46 1.54 0.74
×10−1 0.85 1.27 1.02 1.41 0.91 1.17 1.03 1.21
−10lnL 4.43 4.10 3.77 3.11 4.69 4.86 4.78 4.56
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Table 5: Predicted Probability of knowing Catalan (in %) Standard errors in small fonts
Catalan Skill Reading and Speaking Writing
Census Year 1991 1996 1991 1996
Gender Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Actual 62.31 70.54 73.72 81.54 36.51 47.63 46.27 59.10
48.46 45.59 44.02 38.79 48.14 49.94 49.86 49.17
Predicted 62.36 70.57 73.79 81.59 36.57 47.70 46.33 59.16
0.67 0.15 0.65 0.12 0.40 0.16 0.42 0.15
Counterfactuals
Switch year 62.30 72.52 73.19 79.82 36.36 49.87 47.64 58.29
0.67 0.15 0.65 0.12 0.40 0.17 0.43 0.14
Diff. year -0.06 1.95 -0.60 -1.77 -0.21 2.17 1.31 -0.87
0.95 0.21 0.92 0.17 0.57 0.23 0.60 0.21
Switch gender 65.68 67.14 77.50 78.10 41.05 42.95 52.48 53.03
0.70 0.15 0.69 0.13 0.45 0.15 0.48 0.15
Diff. gender 3.32 -3.44 3.71 -3.49 4.48 -4.74 6.15 -6.12
0.97 0.21 0.95 0.17 0.60 0.21 0.64 0.22
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Table 6. Employment Equation by Reading and Speaking Skills
Standard errors in small fonts
Census Year 1991 1996
Gender Men Women Men Women
Knowledge Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw
Const. -1.98 -3.07 -2.44 -3.33 -2.66 -4.28 -1.89 -2.58
0.26 0.29 0.28 0.38 0.23 0.38 0.24 0.52
Schooling (S) 1.25 13.76 6.09 0.28 4.07 20.17 3.38 7.11
×10−2 1.72 1.93 1.92 2.97 1.87 2.78 2.03 4.03
S2 -5.13 -28.99 -5.46 28.24 -13.95 -25.04 2.08 18.55
×10−4 5.82 7.68 6.18 10.79 7.44 10.21 7.71 13.29
Age 1.06 1.04 0.63 0.63 1.16 1.27 0.64 0.81
×10−1 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.18
Age 2 -1.37 -1.20 -0.60 -0.51 -1.51 -1.34 -0.63 -0.60
×10−3 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.19
Age ×S 7.64 -5.04 4.32 -0.99 9.12 -20.89 7.27 -8.56
×10−4 2.65 3.76 3.21 5.31 2.35 4.65 2.70 6.73
Norm 11.72 76.92 -36.93 123.81 -73.06 91.73 -33.51 124.71
×10−3 45.39 63.34 44.33 77.34 34.32 69.48 33.66 89.42
Married 5.14 5.04 -0.20 -0.73 4.71 4.76 0.44 0.35
×10−1 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.32 0.21 0.31 0.19 0.37
Lleida 2.91 2.45 2.96 2.81 3.26 2.54 2.13 1.82
×10−1 0.44 0.73 0.44 0.88 0.39 0.83 0.37 1.09
Girona 2.56 0.77 1.24 -0.78 1.93 1.55 2.36 2.63
×10−1 0.39 0.55 0.36 0.62 0.33 0.67 0.32 0.82
Tarragona 1.82 2.00 1.89 1.44 1.66 0.95 1.48 2.32
×10−1 0.35 0.47 0.35 0.58 0.28 0.50 0.29 0.66
PartM 3.41 4.32 4.14 6.37 3.96 4.73 2.40 2.15
0.49) 0.66 0.48 0.75 0.36 0.60 0.35 0.75
ServM -7.00 -4.56 -3.87 -1.48 -8.29 -3.09 -4.28 -5.02
×10−1 0.84 1.13 0.81 1.30 0.73 1.27 0.72 1.56
ρ -0.05 0.16 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.13 -0.19 0.01
0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
LRT (ρ = 0) 2.03 27.14 1.66 0.07 6.44 15.79 24.32 0.11
-10lnL 2.72 3.38 4.58 5.66 3.57 3.57 5.17 6.00
Nobs 37660 22786 25687 10730 42597 15188 31965 7235
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Table 7. Employment Equation by Writing Skills
Standard errors in small fonts
Census Year 1991 1996
Gender Men Women Men Women
Knowledge Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw
Const. -1.75 -2.90 -1.94 -3.49 -2.77 -3.76 -1.93 -2.81
0.33 0.24 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.35
Schooling (S) -2.85 11.70 2.96 2.86 -2.69 17.35 -0.52 8.15
×10−2 2.26 1.71 2.50 2.24 2.44 2.07 2.54 2.86
S2 -8.43 -19.24 -6.62 24.55 -5.83 -17.08 4.06 10.28
×10−4 7.39 6.07 7.99 7.63 9.75 7.22 9.84 9.00
Age 1.03 1.14 0.69 0.78 1.45 1.25 0.94 0.81
×10−1 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.12
Age 2 -1.45 -1.31 -0.70 -0.68 -1.91 -1.34 -1.07 -0.61
×10−3 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.13
Age ×S 17.87 -5.78 9.97 -4.91 17.58 -18.14 12.58 -9.06
×10−4 3.49 2.88 4.09 3.89 3.05 3.34 3.23 4.60
Norm -44.70 110.29 -84.31 158.52 -51.21 73.65 -22.40 133.67
×10−3 52.04 54.38 50.33 63.97 39.30 51.09 37.22 62.83
Married 5.36 5.07 -0.03 -0.41 4.44 5.07 0.70 0.38
×10−1 0.36 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.25
Lleida 1.72 3.85 2.83 2.96 2.68 3.58 1.58 2.83
×10−1 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.47 0.52 0.43 0.62
Girona 2.36 1.73 1.06 0.12 1.52 1.94 1.97 2.72
×10−1 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.38 0.50
Tarragona 1.71 2.10 1.46 1.99 1.22 1.67 1.01 2.25
×10−1 0.46 0.35 0.44 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.42
PartM 3.81 3.64 3.26 5.93 3.95 3.97 2.03 2.33
0.63 0.50 0.59 0.56 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.50
ServM -6.86 -5.68 -3.30 -1.85 -6.85 -6.28 -4.59 -3.07
×10−1 1.12 0.87 1.04 0.96 0.94 0.88 0.87 1.02
ρ -0.11 0.10 -0.14 -0.01 -0.21 -0.01 -0.22 -0.05
0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
LRT (ρ = 0) 5.56 5.67 8.22 0.02 23.94 0.12 21.10 1.55
-10lnL 2.82 3.05 4.35 5.38 3.59 3.59 5.01 5.75
Nobs 22073 38373 17348 19069 26725 31060 23166 16034
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Table 8: Probability of employment and Premium (in %) by Catalan skills
Standard errors in small fonts
Census Year 1991 1996
Gender Men Women Men Women
Knowledge Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw Knw. D.knw
Reading and Speaking
Actual 91.05 87.97 81.16 72.28 86.21 81.91 75.99 68.04
28.55 32.54 39.11 44.76 34.48 38.49 42.72 46.63
Pred: Know 91.05 90.00 81.16 75.76 86.21 83.70 75.99 69.05
0.35 0.31 0.86 0.86 0.68 0.24 1.50 0.33
Pred: DKnow 88.09 87.97 75.27 72.29 82.25 81.91 70.93 68.05
0.35 0.24 0.70 0.36 0.45 0.21 0.71 0.24
Premium 2.96 2.03 5.89 3.48 3.96 1.78 5.06 1.01
0.50 0.31 1.10 0.51 0.81 0.30 1.65 0.38
Counterfactual: Switch year
Pred: Know 87.39 84.13 75.04 66.10 90.24 89.59 81.17 76.99
0.41 0.20 0.98 0.26 0.57 0.32 1.33 0.49
Pred: DKnow 83.29 82.18 69.56 65.39 87.05 87.55 75.15 73.10
0.43 0.23 0.76 0.27 0.38 0.30 0.66 0.38
Premium 4.10 1.95 5.48 0.71 3.20 2.05 6.02 3.89
0.62 0.42 1.26 0.58 0.66 0.23 1.47 0.34
Counterfactual: Switch gender
Pred: Know 82.17 77.08 89.98 89.19 76.60 70.05 85.78 83.44
0.52 0.19 0.63 0.51 0.92 0.17 1.11 0.61
Pred: DKnow 76.69 74.17 87.25 86.96 71.64 69.58 82.46 81.54
0.54 0.26 0.51 0.52 0.59 0.21 0.55 0.56
Premium 5.47 2.92 2.73 2.23 4.96 0.47 3.32 1.90
0.80 0.54 0.72 0.30 1.13 0.42 1.20 0.27
Writing
Actual 90.40 89.59 82.45 74.99 85.57 84.66 77.02 70.91
29.46 30.54 38.04 43.31 35.14 36.04 42.07 45.42
Pred: Know 90.40 90.69 82.45 78.75 85.58 84.99 77.02 73.40
0.25 0.36 0.57 0.58 0.45 0.40 0.98 0.55
Pred: DKnow 88.56 89.59 76.89 75.00 85.08 84.65 72.98 70.91
0.32 0.64 0.66 0.96 0.41 0.60 0.76 0.74
Premium 1.84 1.09 5.56 3.75 0.59 0.43 4.04 2.48
0.40 0.73 0.87 1.11 0.60 0.73 1.24 0.91
Counterfactual: Switch year
Pred: Know 86.05 84.33 75.67 69.88 89.68 90.53 82.77 80.97
0.25 0.48 0.62 0.65 0.41 0.35 0.87 0.53
Pred: DKnow 85.49 84.76 71.03 68.07 88.10 89.43 77.42 75.74
0.37 0.83 0.73 1.05 0.36 0.49 0.70 0.71
Premium 0.55 -0.43 4.64 1.81 1.58 1.09 5.36 5.23
0.50 0.98 1.01 1.28 0.49 0.55 1.08 0.81
Counterfactual: Switch gender
Pred: Know 83.37 79.89 89.56 90.03 77.28 74.00 85.32 85.08
0.26 0.54 0.49 0.48 0.55 0.52 0.79 0.52
Pred: DKnow 77.77 76.56 87.98 88.61 72.94 72.35 85.58 84.26
0.47 1.12 0.51 0.65 0.55 0.85 0.57 0.62
Premium 5.59 3.33 1.59 1.42 4.34 1.65 -0.27 0.81
0.65 1.29 0.57 0.65 0.84 1.05 0.89 0.62
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Table 9: Direct and Indirect Marginal Effects on Premium for Reading and Speaking Catalan
Standard errors in small fonts
Men 1991 Women 1991 Men 1996 Women 1996
Dir Ind Tot Dir Ind Tot Dir Ind Tot Dir Ind Tot
Premium (%) 2.61 5.17 3.39 4.31
0.81 1.61 1.10 2.02
School -0.86 0.38 -0.48 0.31 0.14 0.45 -0.90 0.52 -0.39 -0.57 0.43 -0.14
0.49 0.09 0.49 0.72 0.03 0.72 0.70 0.15 0.70 0.99 0.11 0.99
Age -0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.18 0.02 -0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.21 0.02 -0.19
0.04 0.49 0.49 0.08 0.22 0.22 0.06 0.79 0.79 0.12 0.86 0.86
Norm -1.19 0.86 -0.33 -4.64 0.22 -4.42 -3.66 0.90 -2.76 -4.94 0.61 -4.32
1.23 0.10 1.23 2.49 0.03 2.49 1.70 0.11 1.70 2.93 0.09 2.93
Married -1.62 -0.02 -1.64 1.66 -0.09 1.57 -1.98 0.04 -1.94 0.19 -0.18 0.01
0.40 0.04 0.40 1.13 0.02 1.13 0.57 0.05 0.57 1.24 0.05 1.24
Lleida -0.23 0.64 0.41 -0.75 0.13 -0.62 0.25 0.33 0.58 0.40 0.19 0.59
1.02 0.08 1.02 2.18 0.03 2.18 1.45 0.11 1.45 3.05 0.11 3.05
Girona 2.05 0.57 2.62 5.62 0.18 5.80 0.15 0.69 0.84 -1.34 0.34 -1.00
0.91 0.07 0.91 1.90 0.03 1.90 1.35 0.09 1.35 2.32 0.08 2.32
Tarragona -0.83 0.39 -0.44 0.54 0.16 0.70 0.99 0.63 1.62 -2.84 0.31 -2.53
0.81 0.06 0.81 1.68 0.03 1.68 1.09 0.07 1.09 2.00 0.07 2.00
PartM -0.27 0.02 -0.25 -0.81 0.01 -0.80 -0.32 0.02 -0.29 0.03 0.01 0.04
0.13 0.01 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.17 0.01 0.17 0.26 0.01 0.26
ServM -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.02
0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.06
WriteM 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
CbornM 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
NbornC -4.15 -4.15 -1.51 -1.51 -5.68 -5.68 -5.06 -5.06
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.24 0.24
A9 1.97 1.97 0.51 0.51 2.68 2.68 1.36 1.36
0.23 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.51 0.51 1.26 1.26
YSM 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Andalusia -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18
0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
PV-Balea 0.56 0.56 0.12 0.12 0.55 0.55 0.67 0.67
0.14 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.16
Franja 0.75 0.75 0.41 0.41 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.74
0.22 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.24
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Table 10: Direct and Indirect Marginal Effects on Premium for Writing Catalan
Standard errors in small fonts
Men 1991 Women 1991 Men 1996 Women 1996
Dir Ind. Tot Dir Ind. Tot Dir Ind. Tot Dir Ind. Tot
Premium (%) 1.36 4.61 0.50 3.40
1.13 1.99 1.32 2.16
School -0.75 0.34 -0.42 -0.23 0.45 0.22 -1.05 0.47 -0.58 -0.82 0.53 -0.28
0.50 0.06 0.50 0.60 0.07 0.60 0.58 0.10 0.58 0.68 0.13 0.68
Age -0.11 -0.01 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.10 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.10
0.04 0.39 0.39 0.08 0.59 0.59 0.06 0.72 0.72 0.10 0.89 0.89
Norm -2.46 0.35 -2.11 -6.71 0.36 -6.36 -2.61 0.01 -2.60 -4.75 0.25 -4.49
1.19 0.07 1.19 2.24 0.09 2.24 1.36 0.08 1.36 2.19 0.08 2.19
Married -0.32 -0.38 -0.70 1.14 -0.45 0.69 -1.81 -0.30 -2.11 0.89 -0.44 0.45
0.46 0.03 0.46 1.08 0.04 1.08 0.53 0.04 0.53 1.02 0.05 1.02
Lleida -2.90 0.22 -2.68 -1.32 0.35 -0.96 -1.57 0.35 -1.22 -3.78 0.28 -3.50
0.95 0.06 0.95 1.80 0.08 1.80 1.15 0.07 1.15 2.03 0.09 2.03
Girona 0.51 0.33 0.84 2.35 0.42 2.77 -0.86 0.64 -0.22 -2.49 0.34 -2.15
0.88 0.05 0.88 1.65 0.06 1.65 1.11 0.06 1.11 1.69 0.07 1.69
Tarrago -0.80 0.25 -0.55 -1.91 0.29 -1.62 -0.91 0.44 -0.47 -3.78 0.34 -3.44
0.81 0.04 0.81 1.52 0.06 1.52 0.93 0.05 0.93 1.53 0.06 1.53
PartM -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.87 -0.03 -0.90 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 -0.01 -0.14
0.14 0.01 0.14 0.24 0.01 0.24 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.20 0.01 0.20
ServM -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06
0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04
WriteM 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
CbornM -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NbornC -2.73 -2.73 -3.34 -3.34 -4.66 -4.66 -4.46 -4.46
0.09 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.29
A9 0.83 0.83 0.94 0.94 1.39 1.39 1.08 1.08
0.37 0.37 0.91 0.91 1.06 1.06 1.65 1.65
YSM 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Andalusia -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.24 -0.24
0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
PV-Balearics 0.56 0.56 0.13 0.13 0.59 0.59 0.36 0.36
0.12 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17
Franja 0.59 0.59 0.71 0.71 0.41 0.41 0.18 0.18
0.18 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.28
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Table 11: Premium (in %) computed excluding municipal and origin variables
Standard errors in small fonts
Group Men 1991 Women 1991 Men 1996 Women 1996
Knowledge Kn. D.Kn Avr Kn D.Kn Avr Kn D.Kn Avr Kn D.Kn Avr
Reading and Speaking
Baseline 2.96 2.03 2.61 5.89 3.48 5.17 3.96 1.78 3.39 5.06 1.01 4.31
0.50 0.31 0.81 1.10 0.51 1.61 0.81 0.30 1.10 1.65 0.38 2.02
No municipi 2.59 2.00 2.37 5.55 3.55 4.96 3.72 2.02 3.28 5.02 1.79 4.42
0.52 0.34 0.86 1.14 0.52 1.66 0.85 0.31 1.15 1.73 0.40 2.11
No origin 2.19 2.24 2.21 6.13 3.79 5.44 2.73 2.06 2.55 4.80 2.41 4.36
0.87 0.57 1.44 2.19 0.96 3.16 1.63 0.57 2.21 3.60 0.76 4.36
Writing
Baseline 1.84 1.09 1.36 5.56 3.75 4.61 0.59 0.43 0.50 4.04 2.48 3.40
0.40 0.73 1.13 0.87 1.11 1.99 0.60 0.73 1.32 1.24 0.91 2.16
No municipi 1.61 1.07 1.27 5.13 3.96 4.52 0.62 0.70 0.67 4.11 2.99 3.65
0.47 0.86 1.33 0.99 1.30 2.30 0.67 0.82 1.49 1.36 1.02 2.39
No origin 1.95 1.60 1.73 6.15 4.89 5.49 0.49 1.60 1.08 4.15 3.92 4.06
0.55 0.98 1.52 1.33 1.68 3.02 0.95 1.06 2.01 2.05 1.35 3.41
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Table 12: Direct and Indirect Marginal Effects of Schooling and Age on Premium (in %)
computed excluding municipal and origin variables. Standard errors in small fonts
Men 1991 Women 1991 Men 1996 Women 1996
Dir Indir Tot Dir Indir Tot Dir Indi Tot Dir Indi Tot
Reading and Speaking
Schooling
Baseline -0.86 0.38 -0.48 0.31 0.14 0.45 -0.90 0.52 -0.39 -0.57 0.43 -0.14
0.49 0.09 0.49 0.72 0.03 0.72 0.70 0.15 0.70 0.99 0.11 0.99
No muni -0.82 0.35 -0.47 0.41 0.04 0.45 -0.88 0.50 -0.38 -0.51 0.35 -0.15
0.49 0.08 0.49 0.71 0.02 0.71 0.71 0.14 0.71 1.02 0.09 1.02
No origin -0.96 0.52 -0.43 -0.14 0.61 0.47 -0.91 0.55 -0.37 -0.76 0.65 -0.11
0.51 0.10 0.51 0.73 0.14 0.73 0.60 0.10 0.60 0.91 0.17 0.91
Age
Baseline -0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.18 0.02 -0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.21 0.02 -0.19
0.04 0.49 0.49 0.08 0.22 0.22 0.06 0.79 0.79 0.12 0.86 0.86
No muni -0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.18 0.00 -0.18 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.21 0.02 -0.19
0.04 0.45 0.45 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.75 0.75 0.12 0.69 0.69
No origin -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.18 0.00 -0.19 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.20 -0.03 -0.22
0.04 0.54 0.54 0.10 0.78 0.78 0.07 0.75 0.75 0.15 1.11 1.11
Writing
Schooling
Baseline -0.75 0.34 -0.42 -0.23 0.45 0.22 -1.05 0.47 -0.58 -0.82 0.53 -0.28
0.50 0.06 0.50 0.60 0.07 0.60 0.58 0.10 0.58 0.68 0.13 0.68
No muni -0.76 0.33 -0.43 -0.01 0.20 0.19 -1.10 0.49 -0.61 -0.79 0.47 -0.32
0.48 0.05 0.48 0.57 0.06 0.57 0.58 0.10 0.58 0.68 0.12 0.68
No origin -0.95 0.56 -0.39 -0.78 1.00 0.22 -1.13 0.50 -0.63 -1.00 0.70 -0.31
0.51 0.10 0.51 0.71 0.21 0.71 0.52 0.11 0.52 0.62 0.18 0.62
Age
Baseline -0.11 -0.01 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.10 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.10
0.04 0.39 0.39 0.08 0.59 0.59 0.06 0.72 0.72 0.10 0.89 0.89
No muni -0.11 -0.01 -0.12 -0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.11 -0.04 0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10
0.04 0.41 0.41 0.08 0.36 0.36 0.06 0.75 0.75 0.11 0.79 0.79
No origin -0.09 -0.06 -0.14 -0.03 -0.11 -0.14 0.13 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10
0.04 0.51 0.51 0.10 0.99 0.99 0.08 0.71 0.71 0.14 1.02 1.02
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 % Understands
 
 % Speaks 
 
 % Reads 
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Figure 1. Percentage of the population that knows Catalan by language skill
(Source: Reixach 1997)
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Figure 2: Spoken Catalan in Catalonia, Valencia and Balearics (Source: Vallverdú 1990)
